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ABSTRACT 
This paper develops the concept of fictive publics through the proximate gestures of 
rewriting, refolding and refleshing of certain characters. Feminist and queer 
rewritings of canonical literary texts have become a fairly lucrative area of 
publication, from Angela Carter’s now classic fairy tale collection The Bloody 
Chamber (1979) to Kathy Acker’s Eurydice in the Underworld (1997), and a more 
recent spate of mythological rewritings including Ali Smith’s Girl Meets Boy (2007) 
and Ursula K. le Guin’s Lavinia (2008). The intervention into patriarchal mythical 
structures via rewriting has been well documented by Cixous (1975), Rich (1976) and 
Miller (1986), but the ways in which this interrelates with the philosophical feminist 
and new materialist projects of the radical rewriting of modernity itself has not yet 
been investigated. In this paper I argue that a paradoxical relationality structures the 
concept of fictive publics, which is analogous to the modernist gesture of 
defamiliarization. Publics presuppose a proximity of strangers (Warner, 2002), and 
the concept of proximity is vital to queer studies (Ahmed 2000, 2006). Rewriting is 
constituted by a particular type of radical and contentious movement which has 
significance for feminist thought. Using these examples I explore the creative process 
of radical rewriting as a material gesture of intervention. 
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A revolution in thought and ethics is needed if the work of sexual difference is 
to take place. We need to reinterpret everything concerning the relations 
between the subject and discourse, the subject and the world, the subject and 
the cosmic, the microcosmic, the macrocosmic. (Irigaray 1993, 6) 
This constitutive and normative environment of strangerhood . . . requires our 
constant imagining.  (Warner 2002, 417) 
 
What does it mean to give someone a voice, and how does this contribute towards the 
growing of a new literary public sphere?  
The need for a “revolution in thought” described in Irigaray’s text above has been 
echoed by Grosz (2005) and Dolphijn and van der Tuin (2012) in terms of a radical 
rewriting. In this paper I posit rewriting as an embodied enactment of gendered 
materiality, examining a number of strategic reworkings of mythological texts that 
result in a multiplication of personae. The fruits of these rewritings, I argue, can be 
perceived as a type of gendered literary public: a fictive public. This fictive public 
shares qualities of other configurations of publics and counterpublics in that it is both 
familiar and estranged; close and distant; a multiplicity and a unity. To conflate these 
oppositional tendencies I develop and affirm a paradoxical relationality inspired by 
the assertion that publics presuppose a proximity of strangers (Warner 2002). 
The concept of the literary public sphere, according to some, pays attention to both 
artistic and commercial interests.  “Dissolution of genres and transgression of borders 
has become the rule, rather than the exception” (Forslid and Ohlsson 2010, 431).  The 
generic dissolution and transgression focused on in this article regards gender, 
narrative and myth. The lacunae of audible femaleness as in ancient patriarchal 
discourses are obvious to us now as feminist researchers, and naturally we want to 
make those silent female voices speak. We make them speak through the creation of 
another fictional being or version of the original, and together these unsilenced 
personae constitute a new type of literary public. My focus in this article, however, is 
the potential for the concept of the public to be used in the fictive sphere.  
Mythological figures are endless sources of fascination for artists and writers, which 
results in a multiplication of these personae. What makes the figures under discussion 
here a public are the unifying and yet estranging notions of gender and sexuality. 
Through the interlinked processes of rewriting, refolding and refleshing, gender 
imbalances are redressed, silenced female voices are unsilenced, and the result is a 
fictive public consisting of a plurality of rewritten female figures who may go by the 
same name but matter differently. These personae are both the same and different as 
the prototypes from which they spring. A public is “poetic world making” (Warner 
2002, 422), and in this article I literalise that concept, drawing together a host of 
fictive personae who collectively make up an enfleshed, emancipatory subjectivity. 
We will start with the process of radical rewriting, which has been championed in 
new materialist thought. As an intervention, radical rewriting goes beyond the 
limitations of what Dolphijn and van der Tuin call “classificatory negation” (2012, 
120) – for example, the ‘post-‘ of postmodernism.  Rewriting is a gesture that is 
simultaneously critical and creative. Dolphijn and van der Tuin demonstrate how this 
gesture relates to sexual difference through pushing dualism to an extreme. The 
supposed ‘paradox’ of feminist thought – that it creates the sexual difference it seeks 
to eliminate – is in fact affirmed within new materialist philosophies.  As they argue, 
feminist theory revolutionises dualist thought by making a qualitative shift from the 
noun of sexual difference to the verb of sexual differing. This allows for sexual 
difference to be traversed rather than overthrown. 
Feminist rewriting or revisionism is not a new strategy or discourse, particularly in 
terms of the rewriting of canonical ‘greats’. These greats can range from ancient 
Greco-Roman texts to more popular folk or fairy tales. The figures I discuss in some 
detail here are Arachne, Eurydice, Iphis and Lavinia, but there are innumerable other 
names that could have equally been the focus. They are mythological staples; they are 
typologies themselves. Their stories are comfortable, and the gesture of revisionism 
involves making them uncomfortable.  The making-strange required here is an act of 
rewriting, refolding and refleshing, which is at the same time an act of 
defamiliarization.  This paper examines the gendered nature of this act and gathers 
together the rewritten, refolded and refleshed beings.  
 
Personae: conceptual, narrative, collective? 
A ‘persona’ is a useful term for encapsulating multiple narrative concepts of ‘role’ or 
‘character’ outside of conventional narrative spaces.  This has been explored by 
philosophers such as Deleuze and Guattari (1991), who believe that philosophy relies 
on conceptual personae to enact the concepts it creates. As they state in What Is 
Philosophy?, “Even Bergsonian duration is in need of a runner,” (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1991, 64). As I have written elsewhere (Palmer 2014, 129), the conceptual 
persona in Deleuze and Guattari’s terminology lifts an utterance or a being out of its 
particular enactment and makes it universal; it changes parole to langue. These 
concepts are just as ripe for the revisionist strategy. Tamboukou (2010) develops the 
concept of the conceptual persona drawn from Deleuze and Guattari into the narrative 
persona when writing about the women artists in her study.  The narrative personae 
“become mediators through whom narrative as philosophy mobilizes thinking and 
narrative as art produces affects” (Tamboukou 2010, 181). The narrative persona 
demonstrates how we might use a person’s story in order to demonstrate the 
movement of a concept. O’Sullivan (2014) develops the concept of fictioning in art 
practice in which art ‘speaks back’ to its progenitor through becoming something 
entirely other and untimely. “For the I is indeed a stranger, but it is only through a 
specific practice that this stranger can foreground itself from the habitual and 
familiar.” (O’Sullivan 2014, 5).  Braidotti (2013) also develops Deleuze and 
Guattari’s concept when she outlines the need for what she calls ‘figurations’, which 
are critical, creative and alternative dramatizations of the subject. “A figuration is the 
expression of alternative representations of the subject as a dynamic non-unitary 
entity; it is the dramatization of the processes of becoming” (Braidotti 2013, 164). 
Before examining some examples of these personae, however, we can take a few 
more examples of conceptual personae and determine how these might be queered or 
gendered.  Deleuze and Guattari’s list leaves no room for the feminine: 
The destiny of the philosopher is to become his conceptual persona or 
personae, at the same time that these personae themselves become something 
other than what they are historically, mythologically, or commony (the 
Socrates of Plato, the Dionysus of Nietzsche, the Idiot of Nicholas of Cusa). 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 64) 
A useful literary addition to the list here might be Virginia Woolf’s Orlando.  Orlando 
both is and is not Vita Sackville-West; Orlando is a both conceptual and narrative 
persona embodying the materiality and fluidity of gender.  Braidotti (2006) and Ryan 
(2013) both read Orlando as personifying a queer new materialist vitalism. The 
following excerpt from Braidotti regarding the Virginia-Vita-Orlando relationship is 
worth quoting in its entirety: 
In other words, one’s affirmation of the life that one is shot through with is 
materially embodied and embedded in the singularity that is one’s enfleshed 
self. But this singular entity is collectively defined, interrelational and 
external: it is impersonal but highly singular because it is crossed over with all 
sorts of “encounters” with others and with multiple cultural codes, bits and 
pieces of the sticky social imaginary which constitutes the subject by literally 
gluing it together, for a while at least. (Braidotti 2006, 198) 
The type of embodied relationality outlined here is precisely the 
rewriting/refolding/refleshing to which the title of this paper refers. What I would like 
to suggest in this paper is a different kind of collective persona: a fictive public. A 
fictive public could be described as a collective of personae engendered by myth and 
reimagined as a multiplicity. Both conceptual and narrative, the fictive public is 
constituted by versions of mythological figures who have been rewritten in order to 
enable the silenced females of the original narratives a voice. 
Long perceived by the male gaze as an aesthetic horror, the figure of Medusa is 
particularly applicable for feminist rewriting.   Bowers (1990) proposes that we 
perceive Medusa and other figures with the female gaze in order for women to 
reclaim their own sexuality. Here women would learn “to see clearly for themselves” 
(Bowers 1990, 218). As we will see a little later in the article, the foregrounding of a 
new mode of seeing is particularly significant here. Looking further back into feminist 
mythological revitalisations, Cixous (1976) infamously invokes the figure of Medusa 
in her exultant manifesto for a corporeal, relational, feminine writing.  
Write! and your self-seeking text will know itself better than flesh and blood, 
rising, insurrectionary dough kneading itself, with sonorous, perfumed 
ingredients, a lively combination of flying colors, leaves, and rivers plunging 
into the sea we feed. (Cixous 1976, 889) 
The problems we can now see with this influential text have been recently pointed out 
by a rising star of the literary transgender world, Juliet Jacques, who rightly points out 
the Orientalist and appropriative descriptions in this famous text, as well as the fact 
that differences of race, nation, class ability, sexual orientation and gender identity are 
only mentioned in passing or not at all (Jacques 2014). Despite these time-contingent 
reservations, however, it feels right to take up the Cixous’ Medusa as a useful 
example of a feminist philosopher’s appropriation of a maligned female figure in 
order to foreground the vital materiality of women’s writing. It is possible to perceive 
of not one but several laughing Medusas, affirmed in all their snake-haired glory. As 
with the other personae examined in the following section, these characters inhere 
with one another forming a kind of mythological palimpsest; the way that they relate 
is through a shared demonstration of the potency of reappropriation. 
 
Fictive publics: Arachne, Eurydice, Iphis, Lavinia 
Arachne 
In mythological terms, spinning and weaving are feminine activities associated with 
both materiality and artifice.  We know that the Odyssey’s Penelope weaves and 
unweaves a shroud for her elderly father-in-law in order to escape the unwanted 
attentions of the suitors clustering around her while Odysseus is away.  Ariadne 
possesses the spun thread that leads Theseus in and out of the labyrinth, whilst 
Arachne’s hubris in the weaving stakes results in her being transformed into a spider. 
Miller’s (1986) concept of the ‘arachnology’ is defined as  
a critical positioning which reads against the weave of indifferentiation to 
discover the embodiment in writing of a gendered subjectivity; to recover 
within representation the emblems of its construction . . . more broadly the 
interpretation and reappropriation of a story, like many in the history of 
Western literature that deploys the interwoven structures of power, gender, 
and identity inherent in the production of mimetic art (Miller 1986, 272).  
Miller reminds us of the literature-as-web analogy with which Woolf presents us in A 
Room of One’s Own and suggests that within the web of women’s texts we may find 
“marks of the grossly material, the sometimes brutal traces of the culture of gender; 
the inscriptions of its political structures” (1989, 275). Miller describes Ariadne as a 
pre-emptive figure for Sedgwick’s homosocial bond (1985). What is interesting in 
both examples is that traditionally they are both silenced and punished for 
overreaching their positions. The conflation of Arachne and Ariadne to “Ariachne” in 
Shakespeare’s Troilus and Cressida has been debated by many literary critics in the 
last century (Bate et al 1996, 292 n.39). Whether a deliberate or mistaken blend of 
these almost-homonymic names, the result is rather ambiguous.   Miller (1992) 
applauds the coinage as a “splendid portmanteau” and an excellent vehicle for a 
deconstructive reading: 
She is both and neither at once. To the similarity and dissimilarity of stories in 
the same mythical or narrative line must be added the lateral repetition with a 
difference of distinct myths, here called attention to by the accidental 
similarity of the names. This clashing partial homonymy perfectly mimes the 
relation between the two stories. (Miller 1992, 14) 
Whilst the laterality of the repetition is a useful aspect to be foregrounded here, Miller 
does not lament the fact that a conflation of two distinct figures here amounts to the 
elimination of both. Prohibited from her own individual subjectivity, Arachne and 
Ariadne fade. To this equation, then, we might rather add the possibility of rewriting 
Ariachne as an entirely new persona with her own voice; rather than eliminating the 
possibility of the other two she adds another persona to the public. 
More recently, Arachne has been recast as restless Canadian travelling sales rep the 
1996 novel No Fixed Address (Van Herk 1986). Rather than spinning or weaving, 
Van Herk’s Arachne peddles women’s underwear and drives along the roads on a 
voyage of self-discovery. “From Calgary roads spider over the prairie. Arachne pores 
over Thomas’ maps, the lines enticing her to quest beyond the city’s radius” (Van 
Herk 1986, 163-4). The verb “spider” appears a number of times in the novel, 
standing for a type of nomadic wandering which transforms the act into something 
else entirely. Resonances with Braidotti’s theories of the nomad are inescapable.  
 . . . the feminist subject needs to activate difference counter-memories and 
actualise alternative political practices. Becoming-nomadic means that one 
learns to reinvent oneself and to desire the self as a process of qualitative 
transformation. (Braidotti 2013, 344-345). 
Whilst spinning and weaving are a means to an end, the “spidering” encountered here 
is an autonomous movement that is an end unto itself. Furthermore, Arachne’s desire 
to move beyond the lines meted out for her on maps is palpable throughout the novel.  
Van Herk’s Arachne therefore continues and develops the project of Arachne the 
spinner, but instead of being transformed into a spider as punishment for overreaching 
she rather has the agency of her own transformation, which, like Braidotti’s 
becoming-nomadic, does not have an end point.  
 
Iphis 
. . . the imagination doesn’t have a gender. (Smith 2007, 97) 
Ali Smith’s Girl Meets Boy transplants the Iphis/Ianthe myth to Inverness in the year 
2007. Part of the Canongate Myths series which also contains Atwood’s famous 
Penelopiad (2005), this novella queers its very own narrative line through syntactical 
playfulness. Iphis is reconstituted as Robin, a gender-fluid political activist with 
whom Anthea, reluctant employee of evil bottled water company Pure, falls in love. 
As Mitchell (2013) points out in her queer reading of Smith’s text, the central motif of 
Girl Meets Boy is a material element: water. Rather than the predictable association of 
water with the feminine, Mitchell reads it as dismantling the gender binary and 
standing for a type of sexual desire that is quite literally fluid. Water and watery 
language “eschews the logic of penetrating/penetrated (and thus, by extension, of 
masculine/feminine), so that erotic experience renders the body liquid, malleable but 
forceful: finally, watery motifs here express the saltiness of bodily fluids, a body 
dissolved in desire, the boundaries between bodies likewise dissolving” (Mitchell 
2013, 70).  New materialism teaches us the inseparability of water and the body. An 
example: Alaimo in Bodily Natures (2010) cites Steingraber’s (2001) narrative of the 
material ecologies of motherhood and focuses in on a moment in which Steingraber 
drinks water which then becomes blood plasma and suffuses through the amniotic sac, 
in order to demonstrate that her theory of transcorporeality “her body, the habitat for 
her developing child, is inextricably linked to the wider world . . . Steingraber 
imaginatively transforms a medical test for genetic ‘abnormalities’ into a poetic 
exploration of how the substances of the vast world flow through her body as well as 
her daughter’s body” (Alaimo 2010, 103-4). Smith’s use of water’s universal 
pervasiveness in Girl Meets Boy is much more sexualised, culminating in a series of 
syntactically parallel questions whilst narrating the lovers enthralled in their first night 
together: 
Was that what they meant when they said flames had tongues? Was I melting? 
Would I melt? Was I gold? Was I magnesium? Was I briny? Were my whole 
insides a piece of sea, was I nothing but salty water with a mind of its own, 
was I some kind of fountain, was I the force of water through stone? (Smith 
2007, 102) 
Requiring no answer, these questions beautifully encapsulate Alaimo’s theory of 
trans-corporeality (2010), which sees the body as co-extensive with its material 
environment.  Not only this, but the transitional nature of the language, the bodies 
and the elements invoked are both vital aspects here.  Already a queer narrative, 
Ovid’s Metamorphoses is queered further in Smith’s linguistic virtuosity. The process 
of metamorphosis itself is rendered real and physical, again through the language 
describing the sexual act: “I was hard alright, and then I was sinew, I was a snake, I 
changed stone to snake in three simple moves, stoke stake snake, then I was a tree…” 
(Smith 2007, 102). The list “stoke stake snake” literalises the material process in the 
most radical way possible within recognisable language.  The words are pre-existing, 
but the syntax eschews the syntagmatic line and becomes serial. Another syntactical 
deviation Smith employs to literalise language’s transformative power is the 103 word 
sentence consisting of the repeated phrase “I was…” or “we were…” with a different 
noun or descriptive noun phrase.  
I was a she was a he was a we were a girl and a girl and a boy and a boy, we 
were blades, were a knife that could cut through myth [. . .] were the tail of a 
fish were the reek of  a cat [. . . ] can we really keep this up? (Smith 2007, 
103) 
The elimination of any conjunctive word between the phrases in favour of another 
phrase very much conjures up the sense of eternal becoming, queering not only the 
metamorphoses of Ovid’s text but also queering becoming in the Deleuzian sense; 
becoming as developed by Nietzsche (Deleuze 1962).  The linguistic experimentation 
in Smith’s text renders the eternal shifting nature of being matter at every juncture. 
 
Eurydice 
Understandably, the form of the question is a common feature in modern retellings of 
myth as humans retroactively apply reason to the seemingly arbitrary actions of the 
gods. We remember Yeats concluding his famous poem by asking the enigmatic 
question of Leda after Zeus rapes her in the form of a swan: “Did she put on his 
knowledge with his power / Before the indifferent beak could let her drop?” (Yeats 
1923, 127). The Leda who exists in this poem, however, is still silenced. Yeats’ Leda 
only exists through an inventory of body parts: thighs, nape, breast and fingers. The 
form of the question inhabits the almost-contemporaneous ‘Eurydice’ in H.D.’s poetic 
reimagining of the story of Orpheus and Eurydice, but this time Eurydice does have a 
voice. H.D.’s Eurydice is rightly enraged and bombards the silent Orpheus with 
questions:  
 what was it that crossed my face 
 with the light from yours  
and your glance? 
what was it you saw in my face? 
the light of your own face, 
the fire of your own presence? (H.D. 1924) 
 
It has been argued that whilst H.D.’s Eurydice refuses to accept her own death and is 
able to express her rage in her own language, she also “obeys the imperative of a gaze 
that cannot be escaped” (Bruzelius 1998, 458).  While H.D.’s Eurydice acknowledges 
that the contingency of her own existence rests solely upon the gaze of Orpheus, she 
does not seize the opportunity to reverse her position and become the subject rather 
than the object of the gaze. 
Acker’s Eurydice (1997) demonstrates a good deal more agency than H.D.’s, and 
takes control of her own environment. She refuses to play the role Orpheus lays out 
for her as “the sexiest, the hottest piece of flesh I had ever encountered” (Acker 1997, 
26); instead she is a subject in control of her own sexuality with a voice and a good 
understanding of the material agency of language and desire.  Her sexual desire has 
the impetus to make a world: “The sort of sexual desire that when it moves begins the 
world started up in me” (Acker 1997, 22). Acker’s Orpheus cites Blanchot (1981), 
and with Blanchot reduces Eurydice to the role of the that-which-cannot-and-
simultaneously-must-be-seen. For Blanchot’s Orpheus, and also for Blanchot himself, 
Eurydice is “the profoundly dark point towards which art, desire, death, and the night 
all seem to lead” (Blanchot 1981, 99). She is the centre of the night; the point to 
which he cannot or must not look. It is as though Orpheus does not really want her 
except as the dark impossible point of art; the infinite. Whilst Blanchot focuses on 
around this point of impossibility in Orpheus as artist, Acker’s Eurydice here 
demonstrates her own artistic perception:   
The countryside: Silver here is everywhere an object, and swamps. Pale greens 
and browns mix with branches; in this place objects and colors have the same 
status. Sky can be seen either through, or falling through, wood: inside the 
colors is a house. (Acker 1997, 15) 
This beautiful passage demonstrates precisely the matter of which Blanchot speaks or 
pronounces the impossibility of speaking.  Eurydice’s artistic perception here flattens 
the ontological heirarchy of colours and objects. Whilst Blanchot’s Eurydice is the 
muse who calls forth a creative flow of inspiration: “To look at Eurydice without 
concern for the song, in the impatience and imprudence of a desire which forgets the 
law – this is inspiration” (Blanchot 1981, 101); Acker’s Eurydice lives in her own 
world because she makes the whole world hers. (Acker 1997, 1). We can see from 
this description the extent of her agency and power. She is referred to in the second 
person as well as the third; she is equally Eurydice and “YOU”. Consequently there is 
a feeling of universal applicability to this persona who creates new worlds with her 
defamiliarizing gaze. 
 
Lavinia 
Le Guin’s Lavinia is the deliberate fleshing out of a fairly marginal character, whose 
role is to wait and see is interesting because of the placement of Vergil, the poet, 
within the fictive frame. This enables Lavinia to talk about her own story with its 
creator and hers. Lavinia talks to the poet in the sacred space about her fate; he 
foretells some details about her forthcoming marriage to Aeneus which ultimately 
prevents her from agreeing to marry the Turnus, the suitor favoured by her mother. 
Lavinia is well aware of the disservice done to her in terms of an insubstantial 
narrative portrait and voice: “If you’d met me when I was a girl at home you might 
well have thought that my poet’s faint portrait of me, sketched as if with a brass pin 
on a wax tablet, was quite sufficient” (Le Guin 2008, 5).  
The poet wonders aloud why he has revisited the world of the living in order to 
communicate with Lavinia rather than any of his other characters, for example 
Aeneus.  His conclusion is telling: “Because I did see him.  And not you. You’re 
almost nothng in my poem, almost nobody. An unkept promise” (Le Guin 2008, 63). 
The lack of depth in the poet’s portrayal of Lavinia compared to that of Aeneus 
suggests a different kind of ‘seeing’ altogether, as I will return to later in the article. 
As the poet realizes the gendered nature of his creations, so too does Lavinia realise 
the difference between her reaction and her husband’s if he had been presented with 
the fact of his own fictionality. “It has not been difficult for me to believe in my 
fictionality, because it is, after all, so slight” (Le Guin 2008, 119).  The question of 
narrative agency – as opposed to narrative predestination – is left deliberately 
ambiguous. Lavinia has some knowledge of the textual nature of her existence, and 
yet is simultaneously unable to alter her own fate. She is given a voice and is yet still 
denied agency, but only in the same way that all of the characters are simultaneously 
denied it. She appears to be the only character in the unique predicament of knowing 
both her fate and her fictive status.  The relationship between literature and 
mythology, however, is necessarily constituted by an ambivalence in terms of the 
reciprocal levels of fiction, metaphor and literality. Consequently, it matters less that 
Lavinia knows she is not ‘real’, and that her fate is predetermined by a poet-author, 
than it would in contemporary times. It is Lavinia’s centrality in this narrative, as well 
as her relative freedom of movement for a girl of ancient Roman times, which is 
striking here in its revolutionary nature.  Lavinia and her friend run for miles through 
the countryside. “I was all dirt and dried sweat” (Le Guin 2008, 116). Not only is she 
rewritten as an entire character with agency, she is also permitted a messy 
corporeality that directly challenges the ideal embodiment of femininity of the time. 
Here we can feel the refleshing of Lavinia take place as she is rewritten in the 
narrative.   
 
Paradoxical relationaities: intimacy and estrangement 
In order for rewritings such as those detailed above to happen, a particular kind of 
relationship to the ‘original’ version must be affirmed. I argue here that what is 
required is a paradoxical relationality requiring simultaneous proximity and distance. 
Following Fraser’s famous conception of subaltern counterpublics (1990), Warner’s 
conception of publics as presupposing a “relation among strangers” (2002, 217) is a 
key beginning point. The very concept of a proximity of strangers is paradoxical in 
itself, but is nevertheless vital in the thinking of gender, race and other issues. 
Warner’s concept of proximity is developed by Ahmed (2000) in terms of the nation 
as a space, body or house requiring precisely a proximity of strangers. Hickey-
Moody’s concept of little publics (2013) is expressed similarly as being both local 
and global. In terms of gender, Berlant (2008) proposes and advances the concept of 
the intimate public, noting again its paradoxical proximity and distance. The 
symbolisms of intimacy and touch have been well documented within queer literary 
theory. As Carolyn Dinshaw says in her queering of Chaucer’s Pardoner’s tale, “The 
dissonant hand renders what it touches unnatural, makes it strange” (Dinshaw 1995, 
76).  The dissonant hand, then, is estranging with its proximity. It is estranging or 
defamiliarising by its touch. As a researcher you can estrange through your proximity 
to a particular culture or discipline. If you queer a concept you estrange it, which is 
exactly what Ahmed has done with phenomenology (2006).  
Both Cixous (1976) and Rich (1972) pre-empt more recent theories of relationality in 
the thinking of feminist rewritings. “There must be ways, and we will be finding out 
more and more about them, in which the energy of creation and the energy of relation 
can be united” (Rich 1972, 23). The so-called relational turn of the past couple of 
decades has been documented and explored in feminism and literary theory (Schapiro 
1994) psychoanalysis (Mitchell 2000), new materialism (Barad 2003), affect theory 
(Venn 2010), and continental philosophy (Benjamin 2015).  Prior to these explicit 
documentations, however, Cixous is already advocating a feminist materialist 
relationality when she asserts that writing is “precisely working (in) the in-between, 
inspecting the process of the same and of the other without which nothing can live, 
undoing the work of death – to admit this is first to want the two, as well as both, the 
ensemble of the one and the other, not fixed in sequences of struggle and expulsion or 
some other form of death but infinitely dynamized by an incessant process of 
exchange from one subject to another” (Cixous 1976, 883).  
A paradoxical relationality, then, is thus due to a conflation of the opposing vectors 
of proximity and distance. This is particularly relevant when considering new 
materialist thought in relation to the feminist project of radical rewriting I outlined at 
the beginning. We want to be proximal; we want to be close to, preferably to touch 
the thing we are apprehending in order to perceive it anew. And yet at the same this 
strategy for perception requires a critical distance. So we are pulling in opposite 
directions at the same time. The concept of the fold (Deleuze 1988) has been useful 
for two analogical figurations relevant to this discussion: for dissolving the 
internal/external dualism in the thinking of subjectivity, and for figuring relationality. 
Probyn (1993) acknowledges the importance of pleating or folding when both 
constituting and dismantling internality and externality in terms of the self.  The 
figure of the fold demonstrates the reciprocity of the processes of subjectificaiton and 
objectification. Through Deleuze (1988) and Foucault (1988), Probyn demonstrates 
that folding is always refolding: “The act of ‘pleating’ or ‘folding’ (‘la pliure’) is thus 
the doubling-up, the refolding, the bending-onto-itself of the line of the outside in 
order to constitute the inside/outside – the modes of the self” (Probyn 1993, 129).  
 
Gendered perception: queer defamiliarization 
In the introduction to their volume on feminism and classical myth Laughing With 
Medusa: Classical Myth and Feminist Thought (2006), Vanda Zajko and Miriam 
Leonard cite Monique Wittig’s Les Guérillères (1969) and Elizabeth Cook’s Achilles 
(2001) as two exemplary modes of feminist rewritings.  It is noteworthy that the 
section they highlight from Cook’s novel involves the following line (about Helen): 
“Not one of them has ever seen her” (Zajko and Leonard 2006, 2).  As they rightly 
point out, Helen is a figure infamously constructed by the male gaze. Helen operates 
as the catalyst for an entire war through the mere image of her face, and yet no one 
has ‘seen’ her.  This suggests to us that the nature of the ‘seeing’ proposed by Cook is 
more nuanced.  According to Russian formalist thinker Viktor Shklovsky, not a figure 
known for progressive proclamations about gender but hugely important for theories 
of modernist artistic perception, seeing is a truly creative act (Shklovsky 1917).  
Seeing is opposed to recognition, which is a mode of perception that requires no 
autonomous thought.  In the process of recognition, outlines and symbols are 
predicted, rehearsed and recognised; no creativity is required. The now classic text of 
Shklovsky’s is Art as Technique (1917), in which he sets forth the theory of 
defamiliarization (остранение). The purpose of art is to defamiliarize, for Shklovsky; 
he uses this distinction to separate “everyday” language from “artistic” language and 
therefore “everyday” perception (recognition) to “artistic” perception (seeing) 
(Shklovsky 1917, 112).   
Let us turn back now to Helen.  Cook’s line suggests that one has ‘seen’ Helen in the 
Shklovskian sense.  Helen is traditionally recognised without being seen; she is 
perceived automatically as the face that launched a thousand ships. As a substitution 
of part for whole, Helen’s face is a synecdoche for her entire being. The task, then, is 
to build another Helen: a Helen made strange. The way to do this is through giving 
her a voice. This is precisely the process we witness with Lavinia as outlined above: 
the poet’s admission that he did not ‘see’ Lavinia. 
It is my ongoing project to queer the concept of defamiliarization and present it in 
terms of gendered material enactments. The creation of a fictive public is one such 
gendered enactment: the telling of new stories, and in doing so, the creation of new 
voices. What I am calling a queer defamiliarization, then, can go beyond the linguistic 
and the aesthetic to critique the dominant mode of perception of the human subject. 
As feminists we can understand that a queering of defamiliarization itself, considering 
its now canonized and institutionalized position within modern aesthetic theory, 
constitutes quite a radical rewriting, refolding and refleshing.    
 
Conclusion 
Increasingly, I find myself drawn to poetics as a mode of expression, not in 
order to move away from thinking rigorously but, on the contrary, to lure “us” 
toward the possibilities of engaging the force of imagination in its materiality. 
(Barad 2012, 14 n.24) 
The role of the imagination in the thinking of a fictive public is clearly of vital 
importance, from conception to expression. The very materialism of Barad’s own 
materialist writings shows us, in fact, that conception and execution are inseparable in 
their mutual entanglement. As Warner states in the quotation at the beginning of this 
article, what is required for the thinking of what he calls ‘strangerhood’ is constant 
imagining. The conception of a fictive public requires just this: a constant imagining 
and a creative execution. The cementation of this concept and the conclusion to this 
paper is therefore unashamedly creative in its execution: it consists of a list.  The 
listing of names as a feminist intervention is not new; in fact, it is interwoven through 
the text of Wittig”s Les Guérillères (1985). The word LACUNAE punctures the 
narrative throughout, and what fills these lacunae are a fictive public of female names, 
throbbing through the pages.  
AIMEE POMA BARBA 
BENEDICTA SUSANNA 
CASSANDRA OSMONDA 
GENE HERMINIA KIKA 
AURELIA EVANGELINE  
SIMONA MAXIMILIANA (Wittig 1985, 21).  	  
The systematicity of the list is a device Wittig uses throughout her narrative. The 
subversion of syntax is another example of linguistic and material defamiliarization, 
as we saw above in Girl Meets Boy.  The defying of syntactical convention within the 
framework of a narrative packs a symbolic punch as a feminist intervention. One 
concluding list is therefore required, consisting of the rewritings, the refoldings and 
the refleshings discussed in this article. The multiplicity of  rewritings, refoldings and 
refleshings that constitute the fictive public, united by name yet defamiliarized, are 
listed below.  Our task going forward is therefore to affirm and to create. 
ARACHNE THE WEAVER SPINS ARACHNE THE DRIVER ARIACHNE 
QUEER CHILD OF ARACHNE AND ARIADNE EURYDICE THE SEEN 
BECOMES EURYDICE THE SEER EURYDICE THE MUSE EURYDICE 
BEYOND CANCER EURYDICE WHO DESIRES REMAKES THE WORLD 
HELEN UNSEEN HELEN BEYOND CATALYST IPHIS ACTIVIST BEYOND 
DISGUISED BOY IPHIS AS BOY AND GIRL AND GIRL AND BOY AS GIRL 
AS IPHIS LAVINIA MERE BLUSH LAVINIA FLAME-HAIRED OMEN 
LAVINIA SPEAKS RUNS SWEATS MEDUSA NO LONGER SNAKE-CHAINED  
MEDUSA GUFFAWS 
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